There are additional symptoms of global disease. First, widespread social depression. The WHO predicts that depression will soon rank second in the global disease burden. Britain alone spends £32 billion a year on mental illness. (10) How much of such depression can be attributed directly to alienation from our natural environment, and feelings of helplessness in the face of the symptoms I am here describing? Second, increasing global poverty created and sustained by institutions like the World Bank and IMF despite their rhetoric of development. Vandana Shiva describes the "poverty trap, created by the vicious cycle of 'development,' debt, environmental destruction and structural adjustment." (11) The North drains up to $60 billion annually from the South in terms of loan repayment and cheap raw materials, and Shiva shows that women and children are the first to be thrown by the global economy into the ensuing abyss of poverty. Third, insistence by nationalistic, militaristic governments on Gulf Wars despite popular global pacifism. We see easily through the fundamentalist "God-washing" of the current Gulf War to its environmental cause in oil resource management. And fourth and finally, and the rapidly accelerating incidence of environmental injustice. Women, children, people of color, and indigenous populations increasingly bear disproportionately the costs of environmental degradation, like health damage, pollution, and the uglification of living space, while privileged groups reap its profits. Social injustice is exacerbated by current environmental crises.

These symptoms indicate a single underlying disease to which the human capacity for reason has fallen victim: a logic of domination that permeates practice and policy. How is that a species so technically competent, that prides itself on its intellectual superiority over all other life-forms, is incapable of better managing its environment in fair and sustainable ways?

Furthermore, ecological reform is inadequate if it fails to account for gendered perspectives. Women in many cultures work closely with their natural environment in shouldering primary responsibility for meeting their family's daily living needs. That women tend to suffer more than other groups when environmental degradation increases has been well-documented. Women throughout the world practice subsistence agriculture, and their economic poverty increases in direct proportion with environmental damage. (17) So-called "Green Revolution" agricultural programs supported by national governments and funded by the World Bank, the IMF, and other funding agencies did much to displace women’s subsistence agriculture in Africa, for example, in favor of large-scale, technology-driven production for trade markets. These programs imported Western patriarchal assumptions about labor division, land ownership and gender roles, and so did little to provide women with the resources they needed to participate. Such programs have actually increased deforestation, desertification and soil degradation, so women must labor harder for longer hours to meet their family’s food needs, and walk further to collect wood for heating and cooking, and water for daily living. Health studies have shown that environmental toxins and pollutants have a particularly significant and poor impact on women’s health, especially their reproductive health. (18) Ecological reform cannot succeed without addressing these issues of gender.

Moreover, while contemporary policy processes are arguably inadequate to meet demands of sustainability and environmental justice, (19) indigenous women’s environmental expertise has supported sustainable practice over long historical periods. (20) Women bring unique perspectives to environmental issues, (21) and the remedial value of indigenous women’s conceptions of nature has been well demonstrated. (22) For example, the Chipko movement in India, whose slogan is "the forest is our home," brought about changes in national forestry policy that rectified issues in environmental justice and sustainability, while the women's Greenbelt movement likewise benefited agricultural policy and practice in Kenya. Globally, 80% of environmental activists are women. (23) Yet a "gender gap" exists in which women's situations and contributions are overlooked, and their voices not given appropriate place in development programs and environmental policy-making contexts. (24) Women remain under-represented in decision-making positions and resource-management careers, (25) and their environmental expertise has been devalued and marginalized as folklore and "old wives’ tales." (26) For reasons of justice as well as practical concern about sustainability, women’s marginalized perspectives need to be incorporated into environmental policy processes.

Thus my diagnosis must be ecofeminist because it begins with data viewed through the lens of gender, and its research outcome is the theoretical insight that the logic of domination currently underwriting global environmental policy and practice is phallic both because it is based on the patriarchal institutions of science and technology, and because it neglects, trivializes, marginalizes and displaces women's alternative perspectives.

Psychoanalytic methodology regularly entails examination of dream images to uncover unconscious drives that manifest in dysfunctional behavior. E. Ann Kaplan applied this methodology to contemporary film imagery to in order to reveal a cultural symbolic that is dysfunctional with respect to women because the gaze it constructs is inherently male. (27) In Speculum of the Other Woman, Luce Irigaray likewise psychoanalyses the Western tradition of philosophy by examining the literary imaginary of Plato's cave analogy. (28) She argues that the function of the cave analogy is to displace the question of origin from the body of the mother to the father's philosophical vision of the eternal forms. (29) From out of the cave is born the philosopher, who leaves behind the natural world (to which the mother belongs) and moves instead to the world of ideas. (30) Plato's analogy is thus a mythical symbolic that frees man from both woman and nature by appropriating the birthing function to render eternal form, not mortal flesh, the ultimate source.

Is Irigaray right that the philosophical drive is motivated unconsciously by death-avoidance? My concern here is not to answer this question, but to draw attention to the cave analogy as a founding moment in the Western tradition of philosophy. It provides an (immaculate) conception of truth that is universal, eternal and unchanging—things nothing in nature can be. This erection of truth undergirds the highly valued objectivity that informs modern science and continues to set the standard for knowledge. I have argued that technoscientific ideology is responsible for the logic of domination currently overrunning the globe, and that this ideology is founded on the conception of truth established by Plato in the intellectual history of the West. The real truth of technoscience lies not just in its marshalling of data into theories, in its facts that have been submitted to empirical verification, but in its opening of a world wherein all that is encountered is reduced to object. The objectivity of the Newtonian mechanistic paradigm deprives nature conceptually of its teleology--nature is no longer self-directed growth as it was for Aristotle, but rather consists only of bodies in motion subject to forces. By displacing the notion that natural entities have ends of their own, modern science paves the way for their appropriation to human ends. Thus scientific objectivity renders nature nothing more than resources to be harnessed and exploited by technology.

A remedial therapy accordingly entails prescription of an alternative conception of truth. This alternative conception is organic because it speculates truth according to a natural model. In the epistemology of the indigenous peoples of North America, "all of our teachings come from things in nature, they come from the growing cycle, and everything is tied to the earth." (31) The alternative vision of truth I propose accepts this principle, and recognizes that everything in nature is born, can grow and flourish, and must eventually pass its prime, wither and die. This revision of truth is organic in that it acknowledges that truths also are born and can flourish, but eventually pass their prime and wither. The truth of modern technoscience is subject to just such a process. While science has brought technological successes that have improved the human condition, a point has been reached in history at which alternative ontologies and epistemologies are more useful to rise to the challenges of sustainability and environmental justice. I will briefly characterize an alternative epistemology by arguing first for the epistemic metaphor of the ear rather than the eye, and secondly, for embodied, situated knowledge over abstract reason. Then I will provide one element of a sustainable ontology of nature: teleology over mechanism.

Traditionally, philosophical accounts have favored epistemic metaphors of vision. There is Plato’s sun, Descartes’ "light of nature," and Husserl’s "eidetic seeing." (32) For each of these thinkers it is explicitly by means of vision that one attains universal insight. I am arguing against such universal insight in favor of the finitude and particularization of knowledge. I advocate an epistemology that is aural in two ways. First, it is aural because it listens to nature. Backpacking in the Canadian Rockies, I learned to hear beneath the squelching of my boots in mud, and swishing of my pack against my trousers, to the silence of the woods; and beneath that silence to the incessant noise of the many natural processes by which I was surrounded. I learned quickly that key to survival is to listen carefully to nature’s clues. Nature is in constant conversation with me, and not to listen is to get caught in a rockslide or avalanche, fall into a glacial melt-hole, miss the opportunity to catch dinner, or fail to set up camp before the deluge. Listening is not just a strategy for safe backpacking. Christine Turner, a geologist with the United States Geological Survey, argues that rocks talk, and that listening is a crucial part of scientific process; while Victor Baker, Head of the Department of Hydrology and Water Resources at the University of Arizona and past President of the Geological Society of America, argues for what he calls "Earth-directed" rather than "theory-directed" science, that is, science that is in conversation with the Earth. (33) Listening is a strategy for sustainable science that uses experience to accommodate theory to particular contexts, rather than imposing abstract, universalized theory onto what is encountered in the natural world. My ecofeminist conception of truth is phenomenological because it entails an epistemological openness to nature and natural process.

Secondly, an organic conception of truth supports an epistemology that relies on narrative voice. Karen Warren has demonstrated the value of first-person narrative in ecofeminist methodology. (34) Such narrative method gives voice to a felt sensitivity; expresses a variety of ethical attitudes underplayed or overlooked in mainstream ethics, for example, the caring versus the conqueror relation; develops a stance that emerges from diverse, alternatively situated voices, rather imposing a priori conceptual tools on the experience of others; and finally, has the argumentative significance of suggesting what might counts as an appropriate ethical conclusion. Using the epistemic metaphor of the ear puts front and center the methodological strategy of inclusion of diverse voices in environmental philosophy. Current environmental problems will not be solved by technical "progress" alone, but require listening and learning from the voices of those historically marginalized by technoscientific ideology and practice. Indigenous women, for example, present no experimental data and publish rarely in academic journals, yet their knowledge has sustained environmental practice over generations because their knowledge is adapted to local conditions. Using the ear to gain access to their wisdom will not generate universal knowledge, but situated insights, appropriate to specific contexts.

An organic conception of truth relies on situated epistemologies, grounded in embodiment, in contrast to the abstractions of Cartesian subjectivity. There is no universal subject, but only people whose experiences are informed by gender, historical location, and cultural context. Reason is a bodily function, and moral subjects are embodied selves. The body locates human being squarely in the natural order, as a member of the natural community rather than an overlord removed from the natural realm by a privileged capacity for reason. Treating non-human living entities, species and ecosystems as objects of moral consideration entails caring about them, and bodily experience is a basis for caring.

Accordingly, this ecofeminist analysis embraces feminist critiques of the polarized dualism between reason and emotion that privileges reason and denigrates emotion. Thinkers such as Benhabib, Blum, Gilligan and Lloyd have argued that the rationalist account of emotions is philosophically inadequate, especially in its corollary distinction between public reason and private emotion, and implicitly gender-biased. (35) Marti Kheel brings to ecofeminism the insight from Mary Midgley, Sara Ruddick and Robin Morgan that a "fusion of feeling and thought" is characteristic of moral life. (36) Deborah Slicer argues that "faith in the rational and universal force of principles at the expense of our emotional responses is naive, [and] based on an insensitivity to our actual moral psychology and a Western and perhaps masculinist contempt for our emotions, which are considered ‘womanish.’" (37) Val Plumwood argues that the rationalist account characterizes caring and love as personal and particular "feminine" emotions that are "unreliable, untrustworthy, and morally irrelevant, an inferior domain to be dominated by a superior, disinterested (and of course masculine) reason," and that emotions are further rendered inferior because they are "linked to the sphere of nature, not the realm of reason." (38)

Reason/emotion dualism continues to figure uncritically in non-ecofeminist environmental ethics. Peter Singer claims that rather than "loving" animals, he argues for their ethical treatment by "appealing to reason rather than to emotion or sentiment ... because reason is more universal and more compelling." (39) Likewise, Tom Regan argues for "a concerted effort not to indulge our emotions or parade our sentiments. And that requires making a sustained commitment to rational enquiry." (40) Marti Kheel points out that their arguments nonetheless rely on emotional appeal, as they hinge on moral repugnance at the mistreating of, for example, babies, the senile and the insane, in which context they suggest there is no criterion for moral worth that does not also apply to animals. (41) Val Plumwood criticizes deep ecologists for their rationalist move to universalization that discards particular connections, despite their reliance on an identification of self with nature, because "it cannot allow for the deep and highly particularistic attachment to place that has motivated both the passion of many modern conservationists and the love of many indigenous peoples for their land." (42) Douglas Buege argues that "responsible knowing takes emotions to be central to cognitive practice." (43) Emotions are an essential component of marginalized environmental perspectives. Recognizing the role of emotion in environmental practice is thus requisite both for hearing indigenous voices in respectful ways, and for incorporating indigenous ways of understanding nature into sustainable environmental policy.

The uniquely ecofeminist insight is that treating non-human living entities ethically entails caring about them, and caring entails feeling. Kheel suggests that "deciding when and to what extent our affective responses are appropriate and helpful involves entering into a particular narrative." (44) Plumwood likewise argues against the usefulness of "conventional ethics of universalization" (45) because concern for nature is not possible through universalization, moral abstraction, and disconnection. Rather "care and responsibility for particular animals, trees, and rivers that are known well, loved, and appropriately connected to the self are an important basis for acquiring a wider, more generalized concern." (46) Empathy with particular aspects of nature, rather than with nature as abstraction, is essential for a non-instrumental treatment of nature, and thus necessary for an adequate environmental ethic. Hence ecofeminist epistemology is a rejection the traditionally abstract or speculative theorizing of the philosophical subject, and favors instead what I have called the organic model: embodied knowledge that privileges the particular and unique, and that is situated by history and culture rather than providing trans-historical, eternal truth. An epistemology that is adequate to sustainability and environmental justice acknowledges the limitations and finitude of any way of knowing--that human wisdom itself is subject to flourishing and waning, like any natural process.

An organic conception of truth that relies on situated, embodied epistemologies has the ontological consequence of displacing the Newtonian mechanistic paradigm of nature with a teleological conception. Listening to indigenous voices and to nature itself in caring ways teaches that nature consists not in inert matter, passively standing by until human being harnesses it toward human ends. The materialist conception is simply wrong. Rather, nature consists in living entities, each on its own self-directed journey of growth toward fulfillment. This is not a grandiose Hegelian argument for the realization of divine teleology in human freedom, but rather the simple claim that Aristotle makes at Physics 2.8, and Paul Taylor echoes in his ethics of respect for nature: individual organisms are teleological centers of life. (47) For example, acorns become oak trees, puppies become dogs, and babies become adults, if they become anything at all. Natural entities are incessantly in motion, and ecosystems are a symphony of inter-dependence. I am not naively idealizing natural processes as inherently good, but arguing that ecosystems achieve a stability (not permanence) because evolutionary process selects organisms whose teleological function fills an ecological niche in the system. Furthermore, I am suggesting that sustainable practices of technology therefore respect natural teleology. They work with natural ends rather than subverting natural process through a logic of domination.

Here are three examples of ways of interacting with nature that respect natural process in contrast to dysfunctional technologies. First, continuous application of chemical fertilizers ultimately exhausts soil, whereas leaving a field fallow allows natural process to replenish nutrients and promotes sustainable agriculture. Secondly, antibiotics attack infection, but eventually become ineffective as bacteria develop resistance. The increasing problem of antibiotic resistance demonstrates that natural process remains one step ahead of technological intervention. Bacteriophages are an alternative therapy. These are bacteria that eat other bacteria while posing no threat to human health. (48) Third, water treatment plants add chemical purifiers to water that remove or render inert harmful elements, e.g. chlorine. Such additives can cause human health responses like asthma, sties on the eye, or multiple chemical sensitivity and similar immune reaction dysfunction. Alternatively, a Flowform is a series of sculpted bowls through which a cascade of water is brought into rhythmic movement enhancing natural patterns of flow. (49) John Wilkes, a sculptor drawing on the work of hydrologist Theodor Schwenk and mathematician George Adams from the Institute for Flow Sciences in Germany, "wondered if it might be possible to design a sequence of forms through which water could fulfill its potential to manifest an orderly metamorphic process ... [that] might bring to physical expression the delicate potential for ordered movement that appears to be inherent in the nature of water." (50) His investigations show that "Flowform-treated water not only was penetrated by rhythmical movements in support of biological processes but also became highly oxygenated and thus showed promise for wastewater treatment." (51) His Flowforms are not only beautiful, but also have applications in treatment of stored water and desalinated water, in irrigation, pharmaceuticals, aquaculture systems, and food processing activities. In Järna, Sweden, Flowform cascades remediate water for swimming pools; and in Germany, Flowform-treated water has been used in beer brewing and bread baking. (52) Flowforms do not bring a logic of domination to bear on water in the process of appropriating it to human ends, but are a technology achieves human ends by working cooperatively with water’s natural tendencies.

An organic conception of truth promotes such technologies that respect natural process. It denies the human superiority over nature, and accepts that human being is a member, not master of the natural order. Incorporating such a directive into funding policies could promote science and technology that are environmentally functional and thus sustainable. Such practices entail recognizing that truth is not universal but finite and situated, and therefore most effective when adapted to context with attentive consideration of appropriateness.

In conclusion, I have defined an organic conception of truth as one that understands that truths, like everything in the natural order, can grow, flourish, and pass their prime. I have argued that scientific objectivity is one such aging truth. It is grounded in and supports a logic of domination that is diseased insofar as it has become an impediment to sustainability and environmental justice, indeed to human survival. I do not suggest that science and technology should or could be abandoned. Rather, I argue that contemporary technoscience is like a yeast infection. Treating a yeast infection does not entail eliminating it, but rather returning the fungus, a natural part of the vaginal system, to healthy proportion. Likewise, Western practices of science and technology are not the only truth, but one way of knowing that at present is over-blown. Alternative epistemologies warrant inclusion in knowledge systems, and often can provide better ways of interacting with nature.

I will close by anticipating three objections I have received in the past. First, I am not anti-science, or a Luddite, but such a fan of the human capacity to understand and interact with other members of the natural order that I would dearly love to see science and technology practiced in better ways, that is ways that are just and sustainable. Secondly, I have been told in the past that rejecting universal truth is "unphilosophical." Diotima taught me that the philosopher is neither wise nor ignorant, but always somewhere in between. An organic conception of truth takes up residence is just such an in-between: it knows neither nothing nor everything. There are many truths to be heard, but no final word. Third, a popular criticism my view has elicited is that an organic conception of truth must, on its very terms, be relative. And not just culturally relative on my terms, but also historically and gender relative. Indeed, the best refutation of my organic conception of truth would be if everyone agreed with me. Rather than resisting disagreement, I count on it. For methodologically central to this view is a demand for exchange between differing perspectives. Exploring the limitations of an organic conception of truth is part and parcel of adhering to it. An organic conception of truth subjects the philosopher to the "law of the provisional," which keeps her or him tentative and open to revision. In the end, then, it’s an attitude towards one’s own way of knowing.

1Drumbeat for Mother Earth, Bullfrog Films, copyright Sandra Hurtado, 1999.

2 World Conservation Union (IUCN) http://www.iucn.org/info_and_news/press/species2000.html, Sept. 28 2004.

3 Alex Kirby, BBC News, January 7, 2004; John Roach, National Geographic News, July 12, 2004.

4 Nigel Pitman (Duke Center for Tropical Conservation, Duke University, North Carolina) and Peter Jorgensen (Missouri Botanical Garden in St Louis), reported in Science and by BBC on Nov 1, 2002

5 Alex Kirby, BBC News, October 7, 2002.

6 Alex Kirby, BBC News, September 28, 2000.

7 Marsha Walton, CNN, May 14, 2003.

8 Linda Hjorth et al., eds. Technology and Society, 2^nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall, 2003), 296-311, 316-318.

9 New Scientist 183, no. 2464 (Sept 11 2004).

10 New Scientist 178, no. 2390 (12 April 2003), 45.

11 Vandana Shiva, "The Impoverishment of the Environment: Women and Children Last" Environmental Philosophy, 3^rd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall, 2001), 292.

12 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H.M. Parshley (New York: Vintage Books, 1952), 144.

13 Francoise d’Eaubonne, Le Féminisme ou La Mort (Paris: Pierre Horay, 1974).

14 Rosemary Radford Ruether, New Woman/New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human Liberation (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), 204.

15 Lynn White, Jr. "The Historical Roots of Our Environmental Crisis," Environmental Ethics: What Really Matters, What Really Works, eds. David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willott (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

16 Val Plumwood, "Nature,self and gender: Feminism, environmental philosophy, and the critique of rationalism," Hypatia 6, no. 1 (1991), 3-27; Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993); Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980); Vandana Shiva, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development (London: Zed Books, 1988).

17 Vandana Shiva, "The Impoverishment of the Environment: Women and Children Last" Ecofeminism, Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, eds. (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1993); B. Kettel, "Putting Women and the Environment First: Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Development." Achieving Sustainable Development, eds. A. Dale and J. B. Robinson (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996).

18 Irene Diamond, "Babies, Heroic Experts, and a Poisoned Earth" Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism, eds. Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1990).

19 Andrew Dobson, Justice and the Environment: Conceptions of Environmental Sustainability and Theories of Distributive Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); David Camacho, ed. Environmental Injustices, Political Struggles: Race, Class, and the Environment (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); Nicholas Low and Brendan Gleeson, Justice, Society, and Nature: an Exploration of Political Ecology (New York: Routledge, 1998); Clifford Rechtschaffen and Eileen Gauna, Environmental Justice: Law, Policy, and Regulation (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002).

20 Deane Curtin, "Recognizing Women's Environmental Expertise" Chinnagrounder's Challenge: The Question of Ecological Citizenship (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999).
21 Annabel Rodda, ed. Women and the Environment (London: Zed Books, 1991); Sarah Warren, ed. Gender and Environment: Lessons from Social Forestry and Natural Resource Management (Toronto: Aga Khan Foundation, 1992); Geraldine Reardon, Women and the Environment (Oxford: Oxfam, 1993); Carolyn Merchant, Earthcare: Women and the Environment (New York : Routledge, 1995).

22 Paula Gunn Allen, The Sacred Hoop: Recovering the Feminine in American Indian Tradition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986), and "The woman I love is a planet; The planet I love is a tree." Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism, eds. Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman Orenstein (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1990); Karen Warren, "A Feminist Philosophical Perspective on Ecofeminist Spiritualities" Ecofeminism and the Sacred, ed. Carol J. Adams (New York: Continuum, 1993); Rosi Braidotti, ed. Women, the Environment and Sustainable Development: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis (London: Zed Books, 1994); Vandana Shiva, ed. Close to Home: Women Reconnect Ecology, Health, and Development Worldwide (Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 1994); Rosemary Radford Reuther, Women Healing Earth: Third World Women on Ecology, Feminism and Religion (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1996); Alaine Low and Soraya Tremayne, eds. Sacred Custodians of the Earth?: Women, Spirituality and the Environment (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001); Sharon Doubiago, "Mama Coyote talks to the boys" Healing the Wounds: The Promise of Ecofeminism, ed. Judith Plant (Santa Cruz: New Society Publishers, 1989); Annie L.Booth and Harvey L. Jacobs, "Ties that Bind: Native American Beliefs as a Foundation for Environmental Consciousness" Environmental Ethics 12, no.1 (1990), 27-44.

23 Dwivedi, O. P., J. P. Kyba, P. Stoett and R. Tiessen, Sustainable Development and Canada: National and International Perspectives (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2001).

24 Vandana Shiva, Staying Alive: Women, Ecology, and Development (London: Zed Books, 1988); Isabella Bakker, The Strategic Silence: Gender and Economic Policy (London: Zed Books, 1994); Sandhya Venkateswaran, Environment, Development and the Gender Gap (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995).

25 C. Nesmith and P. Wright "Gender, Resources and Environmental Management." Resource and Environmental Management in Canada: Addressig Conflict and Uncertainty, ed. B. Mitchell. 2^nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995); O. P. Dwivedi et al. (2001).

26 Deane Curtin, "Recognizing Women's Environmental Expertise" Chinnagrounder's Challenge: The Question of Ecological Citizenship (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999).

27 E. Ann Kaplan, "Is the Gaze Male?" Women and Values, ed. Marilyn Pearsall, 2^nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993).

28 Luce Irigaray, Speculum de l'autre femme (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1974); Speculum of the Other Woman, tr. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).

29 Irigaray 1985, 385/308.

30 Irigaray 1985, 361/291.

31 Drumbeat for Mother Earth, Bullfrog Films, copyright Sandra Hurtado, 1999.

32 Plato, The Republic, tr.Tom Griffith (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 507b-508d; René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, tr. John Cottingham (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 11 et passim (see index, "light of nature"); Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, tr. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), 8-12.

33 Christine Turner, "Messages in Stone: Field Geology in the American West" and Victor Baker, "Conversing with the Earth: The Geological Approach the Uniderstanding," Earth Matters: The Earth Sciences, Philosophy, and the Claims of Community, ed. Robert Frodeman (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000).

34 Karen Warren, "The Power and the Promise of Ecological Feminism," Enviromental Ethics 12, no. 2 (Summer,1990) 125-46.

35 Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and the Concrete Other," Women and Moral Theory, eds. Eva Kittay and Diana Meyers (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allenheld, 1987); Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (Boston: Routledge, 1980); Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Carol Gilligan, "Moral Orientation and Moral Development," Kittay and Meyers (1987); Genevieve Lloyd, ""Public Reason and Private Passion" Metaphilosophy 14 (1983), 308-26; Genevieve Lloyd, "Reason, gender and Morality in the History of Philosophy," Social Research 50, no. 3 (1983), 490-513.

36 Kheel (1985), 144.

37 Deborah Slicer, "Your daughter or Your Dog? A Feminist Assessment of the Animal Research Issue," Ecological Feminist Philosophies, ed. Karen J. Warren (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University press, 1996), 103.

38 Val Plumwood, "Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the Critique of Rationalism," Warren (1996), 157.

39 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: Avon Books, 1977), 155.

40 Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), xii.

41 Marti Kheel, "The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair," Environmental Ethics 7, no. 2 (1985): 135-149.

42 Plumwood (1996), 167.

43 Doulas Buege, "Epistemic Responsibility and the Inuit of Canada’s Eastern Arctic," Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature, ed. Karen J. Warren (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), 104.

44 Slicer (1996), 104.

45 Plumwood (1996), 161.

46 Plumwood (1996), 159.

47 Aristotle, Physics, Books I-IV, trs. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1929); Paul W. Taylor, "The Ethics of Respect for Nature," Environmental Ethics 3, no. 3 (1981): 197-218.

48 Cf. Trish Glazebrook, "Toward an Ecofeminist Phenomenology of Nature," Every Grain of Sand: Canadian Perspectives on Ecology and Environment, ed. J.A. Wainwright (Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2005), 90-91.

49 Cf. Trish Glazebrook, "Art or Nature? Aristotle, Restoration Ecology, and Flowforms" Ethics and Environment 8, no. 1 (2003), 22-36.

50 Mark Riegner and John Wilkes, "Flowforms and the Language of Nature," Goethe's Way of Science: A Phenomenology of Nature, David Seamon and Arthur Zajonc, eds. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 239.

51 Riegner and Wilkes (1998), 243.

52 Riegner and Wilkes (1998), 245-7.